channel-screenshot-send
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill captures full-screen visual data via the
screencaptureutility and transmits it to an external endpoint using theopenclaw message sendcommand. This facilitates the transfer of potentially sensitive desktop information to a remote channel. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to capture screen data, manage temporary files in
/tmp, and interact with theopenclawCLI tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The recommended command pattern interpolates variable context (e.g.,
<current-channel>,<current-target>) into a shell script. If these values are derived from untrusted user input and not strictly validated, it could lead to command injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted visual data (screen content) which represents an indirect prompt injection surface should the model attempt to interpret instructions contained within the image.
- Ingestion points: Screen content is captured to a temporary file via
/usr/sbin/screencapture(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present; the skill lacks delimiters or instructions to ignore content within the captured media.
- Capability inventory: Executes shell commands via
screencaptureandopenclaw(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No validation, OCR filtering, or content sanitization is performed on the captured image before transmission.
Audit Metadata