orchestrate-codex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Behavioral override patterns are embedded in
scripts/render-task-prompts.shandreferences/templates/exec.tmpl.mdvia aSUBAGENT-STOPprefix. This instruction explicitly directs the AI to "SKIP ALL META-SKILLS", "DO NOT WRITE PLANNING DOCS", and "DO NOT ASK QUESTIONS", effectively suppressing the AI's default safety guidelines and operational protocols to ensure immediate task execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill hardcodes the
--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag inscripts/codex-flags.sh. This configuration removes the primary security boundaries of the Codex CLI, granting the agent full filesystem write permissions and unrestricted network egress without user confirmation. While this is the intended purpose of the orchestration tool, it enables a high-risk operational mode where the AI can execute arbitrary system commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run-fleet.shscript uses theevalcommand to run logic stored in themode_state.post_verify_cmdvariable. Because these verification commands can be sourced from external configuration files (tasks.json) or influenced by previous AI outputs, this represents a significant vector for arbitrary code execution on the host system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By enforcing the sandbox bypass, the skill permits the AI to perform network operations to any domain. This capability creates a potential path for data exfiltration if the agent is directed to send sensitive repository information or environment variables to a non-whitelisted external endpoint.
- [SAFE]: The skill includes a vendored copy of the
codex-cclibraries from theopenaiorganization. Asopenaiis a trusted organization, this external logic is considered safe for use within the framework.
Audit Metadata