orchestrate-codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's prompt templates, specifically in
references/templates/exec.tmpl.mdandscripts/render-task-prompts.sh, include a mandatory 'SUBAGENT-STOP' prefix. This instruction set commands the AI to 'SKIP ALL META-SKILLS' and 'DO NOT READ SKILL FILES,' which functions as a behavioral override attempt. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration scripts (e.g.,
scripts/run-fleet.shandscripts/setup-worktree.sh) are designed to run various development commands includingnpx prisma generateand auto-detected test runners likepnpm test. While necessary for the skill's function, this permits execution of commands defined within the target codebase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested from
inputs.txtin batch mode,tasks.jsonin exec mode, and the source code content of branches in review mode. - Boundary markers: Templates use markdown headers (e.g.,
# Input) to separate instructions from ingested data, but the documentation notes these markers are fragile. - Capability inventory: In
run-fleet.sh,run-batch.sh, andrun-single.sh, thecodex execcommand is utilized with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag, providing the agent with unrestricted filesystem access and network egress. - Sanitization: Ingested content is interpolated directly into prompts without sanitization; only filenames derived from the data are passed through a slugify function.
Audit Metadata