use-persona
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script
tools/persona_runtime_loader.pyto process persona data and generate a context card. While this appears to be a core functional component provided by the author, executing scripts at runtime based on user-triggered actions increases the capability surface of the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Dynamic file path construction. The skill reads from
personas/others/{name}/persona.jsonwhere{name}is derived directly from user input (e.g.,/use-persona [name]). This pattern is vulnerable to path traversal attacks; a malicious user could provide a name like../../secretsto attempt to access files outside the intendedpersonasdirectory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection surface. The skill is designed to ingest and strictly adhere to instructions, values, and interaction patterns defined in external files (
persona.jsonandpersona.md). If these files are compromised or if a user can redirect the agent to a malicious file via path traversal, the agent's core behavior and safety boundaries could be overridden. - Ingestion points:
personas/others/{name}/persona.jsonandpersona.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not include instructions to treat the loaded persona data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions that conflict with system safety guidelines.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Read,Glob, andAskUserQuestiontools, and executes thepersona_runtime_loader.pyscript. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the
{name}parameter or the content of the loaded files.
Audit Metadata