ta-research-AFP-auto
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed as an execution wrapper that instructs the agent to run a complex Python script (
ta_agent.py). This script manages an autonomous 12-step workflow, interacting with the local file system and calling external APIs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads project configuration (
CLAUDE.md) and potentially sensitive research data, such as interview transcripts. This information is transmitted to external services, including the Anthropic API for paper generation and DuckDuckGo for literature verification searches. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its handling of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads user-provided research questions in
CLAUDE.mdand interview materials from the project directory (e.g.,.txt,.md,.docxfiles). - Boundary markers: The prompt construction logic in
ta_checkpoints.pyinterpolates the ingested data into task messages without using explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The autonomous sub-agent has significant capabilities, including
write_file,read_file,list_files, andweb_search(network access). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping performed on the ingested research data before it is presented to the LLM for analysis.
Audit Metadata