yistc-linear-issue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, specifically Linear issue descriptions and comments, via the
get_issueandlist_commentstools. This content is used to plan and implement code changes in Step 1 and Step 4. The instructions lack boundary markers or explicit directives to ignore instructions embedded within the issue data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: Step 1 (Reading Linear issue description and comments) and Step 4 (Summarizing the issue).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters to separate issue content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files (Step 5), execute shell commands for git operations (Step 3 and Step 7), and use the GitHub CLI to open pull requests (Step 7).
- Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or filtering of the content retrieved from Linear before it influences the implementation plan.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands to manage git worktrees, create branches, perform commits, and interact with the GitHub CLI (
gh). While these are functional requirements for the stated workflow, they provide a powerful set of capabilities that could be misused if the agent is manipulated by malicious input from a Linear issue.
Audit Metadata