chuinb
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to its reliance on untrusted web data for content generation.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
WebSearchandWebFetchtools during Phase 2 of the execution flow inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
assets/note-template.mdand the instructions inSKILL.mdlack explicit delimiters or safety instructions to isolate fetched content from the agent's logic. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for filesystem writes (saving reports in Phase 5) and shell command execution (running media scripts in Phase 3).
- Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of retrieved web content is performed before interpolation into the final document or command-line arguments.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs the agent and user to install additional helper skills (
zimage-skillandmedia-downloader) from the vendor's GitHub repository. These are documented as vendor-owned resources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates the execution of shell commands using system utilities like
ffmpegandyt-dlp, as well as Python-based CLI tools from the developer's auxiliary skills, incorporating parameters such as URLs and keywords derived from external research.
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