design-ship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data from a URL or local file to drive code generation and PR creation.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts a
<handoff-url | path-to-bundle.json>as its primary argument, which is then processed by thedesign-importskill and subsequent orchestration logic. - Boundary markers: The templates for the PR body and the subagent prompts for test generation do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within the design data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executegitandghcommands, usesWriteto modify local files, and uses theAgenttool to trigger subagents for test generation. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the external bundle data before it is interpolated into agent prompts or PR descriptions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform repository management and open pull requests. - The skill executes
git status,git branch, andgh pr createto automate the shipping workflow. - These are standard operations for a developer tool and align with the skill's stated purpose.
Audit Metadata