github-operations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to interact with and process data from external GitHub resources like issue bodies, pull request descriptions, and comments. This creates a surface where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in those resources to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Operations in
SKILL.md,references/issue-management.md, andreferences/pr-workflows.mdinvolve fetching and reading external text viagh issue view,gh pr view, andgh apicalls. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched data, though it uses technical delimiters like heredocs (
EOF) for shell script safety. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for shell execution and theghCLI for creating and editing GitHub resources, which could be leveraged if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the
Bashtool to executeghCLI commands. It uses variable interpolation in shell scripts (e.g., inSKILL.mdandexamples/automation-scripts.md), which requires careful handling of untrusted input to avoid command injection at the shell level. The skill mitigates this by recommending the use of heredocs for multi-line content.
Audit Metadata