notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes prescriptive instructions labeled as mandatory for task management, which attempts to constrain the agent's operational autonomy and workflow ordering.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified:\n
- Ingestion points: The
source_addtool andresearch_startfunctionality (found in SKILL.md and rules/workflow-research-discovery.md) ingest untrusted data from URLs, YouTube, Google Drive, and local files.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the
notebook_querytool patterns.\n - Capability inventory: The skill environment permits high-impact tools including
Bash,Write, andEdit.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or content sanitization before external data is processed by the RAG engine.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
source_addtool allows the agent to read local files and upload them to the NotebookLM service. This capability could be exploited to exfiltrate sensitive local data, such as configuration files or credentials, if the agent is tricked by a user or an indirect injection.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes theBashtool for environment setup, package management, and authentication workflows.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for the installation of thenotebooklm-mcp-clipackage from PyPI, which is a well-known public package registry.
Audit Metadata