agent-media
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow files
workflows/batch-generate.lobster,workflows/generate.lobster, andworkflows/pip-generate.lobsterconstruct shell commands by directly interpolating user-provided arguments such as${script},${scripts}, and${actor}. Specifically, the batch generation workflow uses a shell loop:for script in $(echo '${scripts}' | jq -r '.[]'); do agent-media ugc "$script" ... done. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters or command substitution sequences, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution in the environment where these workflows are processed. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to visit external product websites and extract image URLs for use as B-roll (Rule 3 in
SKILL.md). This ingestion of untrusted external content represents an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious site could provide crafted filenames or metadata designed to manipulate command generation. - Ingestion points: External websites visited by the agent based on product URLs.
- Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to the agent to treat site content as untrusted or to use specific delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via the
agent-mediaCLI tool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content extracted from external sites before it is passed to CLI arguments.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves downloading a global NPM package
agent-media-cliand usingnpxto fetch the skill repository. These resources originate from the vendor's official distribution channels.
Audit Metadata