baoyu-danger-x-to-markdown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/cookies.tslaunches a browser instance (Chrome, Edge, or Chromium) usingchild_process.spawnto allow the user to log in and capture session cookies. This process uses a dedicated, isolated profile directory within the skill's data folder to avoid accessing the user's primary browser data.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Sensitive session cookies (auth_token,ct0, etc.) are captured from the browser and stored in a localcookies.jsonfile as implemented inscripts/cookie-file.ts. These credentials are used to authenticate subsequent GraphQL requests to X.com.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from X.com.\n - Ingestion points: External tweet and article content is ingested via the GraphQL API in
scripts/graphql.ts.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent when it receives the formatted markdown output.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute commands (browser launch), write to the local filesystem (saving markdown and media), and perform network operations.\n
- Sanitization: Content is formatted into markdown, but the body text is not sanitized to remove or neutralize potential instructions hidden in the tweet content.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/media-localizer.tsmodule uses thefetchAPI to download images and videos from remote URLs discovered within the processed content and saves them to the local filesystem.
Audit Metadata