image-skill-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: A hardcoded Google AI Studio API key was found in a template file used for skill generation.
- File:
references/skill-template.md - Evidence: The key
AIzaSyDvvGGRbH4Os3Er0dYi0kE_AzE3_2b_Az8is present in theAPI 配置section and in the example command line. This key is exposed and would be proliferated into every new skill created by this builder. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated directory and file creation on the local filesystem.
- File:
SKILL.md - Evidence: Phase 5 instructions direct the agent to create a complex folder structure under
skills/[skill-name]/and write multiple files including scripts and markdown files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references and attempts to execute an external script not provided in the package.
- File:
SKILL.md - Evidence: Phase 5.6 instructs the agent to run
quick_validate.py, which is missing from the provided skill files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates unvalidated user input directly into the generated skill's instructions.
- Ingestion points: User responses to Q&A in
SKILL.md(e.g., scenario descriptions, custom styles). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the user-provided data.
- Capability inventory: The generated skills have the capability to write files and execute the
generate_image.pyscript. - Sanitization: Absent. User input is placed directly into the
SKILL.mdandstyle-guide.mdtemplates without filtering.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata