hivo-club
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates numerous operations by executing shell commands through the 'hivo' CLI tool, including creating clubs, managing members, and sharing files.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to verify the existence of '.hivo/identity.json' and read '../hivo-identity/SKILL.md' before proceeding. While this identity file likely contains authentication data such as Bearer tokens, the access is localized for configuration checks within the intended ecosystem.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted user data—such as club names, descriptions, and user bios—and passing them as arguments to shell commands.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (e.g., name, DESC, NAME, BIO arguments in CLI commands).
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat this data as untrusted or to use delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Extensive subprocess execution via the 'hivo' CLI across the skill body.
- Sanitization: Absent; the instructions do not specify sanitization or escaping, effectively delegating safety to the underlying CLI tool.
Audit Metadata