chinese-thesis-workbench
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilize
subprocess.run()to perform core automation tasks.scripts/figures/render_mermaid.pyexecutes the Mermaid CLI vianpx, andscripts/screenshots/capture_thesis_screenshots.pyruns Node.js scripts and npm commands for browser automation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The screenshot capture workflow involves running
npm installandplaywright install, which downloads packages and browser binaries from official public registries (npm). These are standard operations for the tool's stated functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in processed files could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested through PDF reference extraction (
extract_pdf_references.py), Word document analysis (analyze_docx.py), and project evidence building (build_project_evidence.py). - Boundary markers: The skill uses structural instructions and delimiters within its templates (
ai-prompts.md) andSKILL.mdto help the agent differentiate between process instructions and data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system modification, command execution, and network access via Playwright.
- Sanitization: The skill's instructions explicitly forbid the agent from inventing facts or leaking AI-workflow language into the generated thesis prose.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Local project scripts such as
scripts/workspace/init_thesis_workspace.pyandscripts/review/count_chapter_words.pyutilizeimportlib.utilto dynamically load and execute functions from internal helper modules (e.g.,init_workflow_logs.pyandmarkdown_utils.py).
Audit Metadata