generate2dmedia
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local CLI tools such as
codex,grok, andffmpegusingsubprocess.runandsubprocess.Popenin several scripts includingscripts/route_media.py,scripts/cli_media.py, andscripts/media_mp4.py. These executions are core to the skill's functionality as a router. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
scripts/cli_media.pyusesctypes.CDLL(None)to access standard C library functions (renameat2,renamex_np) for cross-platform atomic file operations.scripts/route_media.pycontains a test seam that allows the execution of a script specified by theFORGE_ROUTE_MEDIA_FAKEenvironment variable.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from user-provided prompt files and reference images (e.g., in
scripts/route_media.py). - Boundary markers: User prompts are wrapped in
<art_direction>tags inscripts/cli_media.pybefore being passed to sub-agents. - Capability inventory: The skill performs network requests to provider APIs, writes files to the project directory, and executes subprocesses.
- Sanitization: Logic in
scripts/cli_media.pyandscripts/generate_media.pyscrubs secrets, URLs, and sensitive tokens from error messages and reports. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
scripts/generate_media.pyperforms network requests to download media from established providers including OpenAI, Google, xAI, BytePlus, and fal.ai. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages API keys for multiple providers, reading them from the environment or a configuration file in the user's home directory (
~/.config/agent-sprite-forge/config.json). It isolates these credentials by stripping them from the environment when spawning sub-processes for local CLI routes.
Audit Metadata