run-teamwork

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to manage project directories, start a background hub process ('node dist/bin/hub.js'), and orchestrate terminal sessions using 'tmux' on Unix-like systems or 'wt' (Windows Terminal) on Windows.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates JavaScript files ('/tmp/vibehq-run-spawn.js' and '/tmp/vibehq-run-poll.js') at runtime and executes them using the Node.js runtime to manage agent lifecycle and polling.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The spawning process explicitly utilizes the '--skip-permissions' flag when launching agents, which bypasses built-in security prompts and permission restrictions for the tasks performed by the spawned agents.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted project descriptions from user arguments and interpolates them directly into a system prompt for a Project Manager agent without sanitization or boundary markers. This Project Manager agent has the capability to assign tasks, define research goals, and coordinate workers, providing a vector for malicious input to influence the behavior of the entire agent team. Evidence: Ingestion in SKILL.md ($ARGUMENTS); Boundary markers: Absent; Capability inventory: File writes (fs.writeFileSync), process execution (exec/execSync), and directory management; Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 13, 2026, 10:37 AM