ffmpeg-ops

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous Python scripts (e.g., cut-from-edl.py, probe-media.py, detect-segments.py) that interface with the ffmpeg and ffprobe binaries. Analysis of these scripts confirms that they utilize subprocess.run with argument lists instead of raw shell strings, which is a secure implementation that prevents shell injection attacks.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an 'Edit-as-Code' workflow where the agent is expected to read and reason over transcripts generated from media files (references/edit-as-code.md). This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, as adversarial text contained in a video's audio or metadata could influence the agent's logic during the selection or verification phases.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill includes network-adjacent tools like yt-dlp for downloading media, it does not contain any patterns for exfiltrating local data. The documentation explicitly advises users to strip metadata (-map_metadata -1) when processing untrusted uploads to prevent accidental data exposure.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's instructions in SKILL.md include directives for the agent to follow 'Doctrine: probe first' and 'Footguns' rules. These are functional instructions intended to ensure operational success and output quality, rather than attempts to bypass safety guardrails or override system instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 9, 2026, 06:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ffmpeg-ops