ffmpeg-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous Python scripts (e.g.,
cut-from-edl.py,probe-media.py,detect-segments.py) that interface with theffmpegandffprobebinaries. Analysis of these scripts confirms that they utilizesubprocess.runwith argument lists instead of raw shell strings, which is a secure implementation that prevents shell injection attacks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents an 'Edit-as-Code' workflow where the agent is expected to read and reason over transcripts generated from media files (
references/edit-as-code.md). This represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, as adversarial text contained in a video's audio or metadata could influence the agent's logic during the selection or verification phases. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill includes network-adjacent tools like
yt-dlpfor downloading media, it does not contain any patterns for exfiltrating local data. The documentation explicitly advises users to strip metadata (-map_metadata -1) when processing untrusted uploads to prevent accidental data exposure. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude directives for the agent to follow 'Doctrine: probe first' and 'Footguns' rules. These are functional instructions intended to ensure operational success and output quality, rather than attempts to bypass safety guardrails or override system instructions.
Audit Metadata