fleet-ops
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATIONPERSISTENCEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
scripts/sessions.shreads sensitive Claude Desktop session metadata, including transcripts, titles, and working directories, from local application data paths:~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude-code-sessions(macOS),~/.config/Claude/claude-code-sessions(Linux), and%APPDATA%\Claude\claude-code-sessions(Windows). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/signal.shutility includes logic to send branch and lane status to an external endpoint via thepigeonCLI tool, which is not a whitelisted or well-known service. - Evidence:
pigeon send $(basename "$MAIN_REPO_ROOT") "lane $BRANCH $state" "Requesting land." - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a background daemon process that remains active across the agent's interaction window to poll for state changes and automate git operations.
- Evidence:
fleet startinscripts/fleet.shwrites a PID to.claude/fleet/daemon.pidand executes a continuouswhile truepolling loop. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands provided in the
test_cmdconfiguration using theevalcommand. - Evidence:
eval "$TEST_CMD"within a subshell inscripts/fleet.sh. - [OBFUSCATION]:
scripts/fleet.shuses URL/percent encoding to represent branch names in filenames, hiding the intent of state files from plain-text scanners. - Evidence:
encode_lane() { local s=${1//\%/%25}; printf '%s' "${s//\//%2F}"; }inscripts/fleet.sh. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill author defined in the frontmatter (
claude-mods) does not match the actual vendor context (0xdarkmatter), which may mislead users regarding the skill's origin. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface where it ingests untrusted data that could influence the agent's behavior:
- Ingestion points: Reads session titles and directory names from the Claude Desktop session store and branch notes from lane files.
- Boundary markers: Lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded in session metadata or lane notes.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell command execution, filesystem manipulation, and network communication via external CLI tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on session titles or notes before interpolation into agent views.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill assembles and executes shell commands from local configuration strings at runtime via the
evalfunction.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata