summon
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary script
scripts/summon.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke theclaudeCLI for generating session handover briefs and thefzfutility for interactive session selection. These executions are scoped to these specific binaries and the distillation process utilizes a restricted system prompt (_DISTILL_INSTRUCTION). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
recoverandpickmodes ingest untrusted data from local session transcripts (.jsonlfiles). - Ingestion points: Transcripts are read in
extract_conversationwithinscripts/summon.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured prompt template (
_DISTILL_INSTRUCTION) to guide the LLM during distillation. - Capability inventory: The skill can perform file-write operations (
shutil.copy2,shutil.move) within Claude Desktop's local session directories and execute theclaudeCLI. - Sanitization: The
_text_onlyfunction filters for conversational text and explicitly skipstool_useandtool_resultblocks, and a character budget (EXTRACT_BUDGET_DEFAULT) is enforced to limit the volume of processed data. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses and manipulates sensitive session metadata and transcripts stored in
%APPDATA%/Claude/claude-code-sessions/and~/.claude/projects/. These operations are local-only and are required for the skill's stated purpose of session management and account transfer.
Audit Metadata