testgen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes multiple external project files to influence the test generation behavior of subagents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads configuration and documentation files including
package.json,composer.json,pyproject.toml,go.mod,Cargo.toml,AGENTS.md, andCLAUDE.md, as well as the target source code. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not define clear delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Write,Edit,Bash, andTaskCreatetools, allowing it to modify the filesystem and execute commands. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform validation or escaping of the content read from files before interpolating it into the prompt for the
general-purposesubagent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to execute discovery and analysis commands. - Evidence: The skill uses shell commands like
cat,jq,grep,ast-grep,fd, andrgto extract framework information and function signatures. This represents a capability surface that relies on the agent's ability to handle potentially malicious filenames or file contents safely. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a dynamic preloading mechanism that loads specific sub-skills based on the file extension of the target.
- Evidence: In Step 4 of
SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to preload various sub-skills (e.g.,skills/typescript-ops/SKILL.md,skills/python-pytest-ops/SKILL.md) based on path matching. While these are internal relative paths, the dynamic assembly of the execution context is a form of runtime configuration loading.
Audit Metadata