drive-plan
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) during its audit and fix loop. It consumes findings generated by the
/review-changeskill and passes them to theagents/fix-applier.mdtask for execution. This creates a multi-step chain where untrusted data (code or documentation in the repository) can influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Phase 3 finding packets derived from the codebase via the
/review-changetool. - Boundary markers: None explicitly implemented to separate review findings from core agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities through orchestration, including the ability to write to the filesystem (
Write,Edittools), execute commands (Bashtool), and invoke other agents (Skill,Tasktools). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the findings content before it is dispatched to the fix-applier agent.
Audit Metadata