graphql

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of remote code by cloning and running scripts from non-trusted GitHub accounts.\n
  • Evidence: The skill instructs the user to git clone https://github.com/nikitastupin/clairvoyance and subsequently execute python3 -m clairvoyance.\n
  • Evidence: The skill instructs the user to git clone https://github.com/dolevf/graphql-cop and execute python3 graphql-cop.py.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs unverified external downloads and installations.\n
  • Evidence: It requires running pip install -r requirements.txt on a freshly cloned repository, which can pull in arbitrary and potentially malicious dependencies.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the shell to perform network probing and local file manipulation.\n
  • Evidence: Use of curl for endpoint discovery and schema extraction.\n
  • Evidence: Creation of local files like introspection.json using cat and shell redirection.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the lack of sanitization of external data.\n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through curl responses and output from tools like graphw00f.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat target responses as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (curl), file system writes, and execution of Python/Git commands.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not include steps to filter or escape content retrieved from the GraphQL endpoints.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 10:41 AM