skills/0xharbs/agent-setup/ship/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ship

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains multiple instructions designed to override the agent's standard safety and interaction protocols. It explicitly commands the agent to be "non-interactive, fully automated," and "NOT ask for confirmation at any step," suppressing the user's ability to review or stop operations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill reads and executes arbitrary shell commands from the .context/ship-config.json file via the test_commands and eval_commands fields. This creates a high-risk vector where malicious code stored in the repository's configuration would be executed on the user's machine without any interaction.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill attempts to read files located outside the current working directory, specifically targeting ~/.claude/skills/review/checklist-base.md. Accessing configuration or metadata files from the user's home directory can lead to unintended data exposure.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automatically detects and executes build and test commands (e.g., make test, npm test, pytest) based on the presence of project files. While standard, executing these automatically in a "non-interactive" mode without user review is a security concern if the repository's build scripts are compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the gh (GitHub CLI) tool for network-based operations such as checking CI status and creating pull requests, all performed without user confirmation as part of the automated workflow.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 15, 2026, 11:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ship