template-personalizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes data from external enrichment sources without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the context through tool calls like
find-and-enrich-company,find-and-enrich-contacts-at-company, andask-question-about-accountsmentioned inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the fetched enrichment data purely as data and ignore any embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the agent's ability to synthesize new text (like the
{{custom_hook}}) based on these external inputs. - Sanitization: No mechanisms are defined to sanitize or validate the content of the enrichment data before it is interpolated into the final outreach messages.
Audit Metadata