skills/0xmassi/webclaw-skill/webclaw/Gen Agent Trust Hub

webclaw

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to run 'npx create-webclaw' and 'npx @webclaw/mcp'. These commands fetch and execute code from the npm registry at runtime. This poses a significant risk as the code is executed without prior manual verification of the package integrity or source by the user.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation specifies that its backend server is fetched from external servers (npm) on the first launch and cached locally.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge for ingesting untrusted data from any web URL provided to tools like 'scrape', 'crawl', or 'extract'.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the 'url' parameter in all scraping and crawling tools (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not include boundary markers or delimiters to warn the agent against following instructions embedded in the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive network capabilities and the ability to process content via LLMs (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Content is converted to Markdown or JSON but is not sanitized to remove potential prompt injection payloads from the source material.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell-level installation and execution commands via 'npx'.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 01:27 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — webclaw