xhs-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-generated content from external sources (Xiaohongshu) and presents it to the agent, creating a potential vector for malicious instructions to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from the Xiaohongshu Web API via
xhs_client.pythrough functions likenavigate_search_page,navigate_note_page, andnavigate_user_posted. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or warnings to instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched note titles, descriptions, or comments.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to publish posts through
xhs_publish.py, which could be abused if an agent follows malicious instructions found in ingested content (a read-then-write loop). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or sanitizing external content before it is formatted and returned to the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational instructions in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdrely on the execution of local shell commands. - Evidence: Instructions include running
pip install,playwright install, and multiple invocations ofxhs.pyandxhs_publish.pywith various arguments to manage account state and perform actions.
Audit Metadata