openchatcut
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local video projects which could potentially contain adversarial instructions designed to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Project content, including transcripts, captions, and media metadata, is loaded into the agent's context via the
read_projecttool as specified inreferences/editing-workflow.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not implement boundary markers or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore commands embedded within the project data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses significant capabilities to mutate project files using editor tools, specialized generation tools (e.g.,
image-gen,voice,music), and thereview_edit_sessiontool for final application. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is interpolated into the agent's workflow.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a dynamic capability extension mechanism through the
load_skilltool. - According to
SKILL.md, invokingload_skillallows the agent to discover and register new tools from the live MCP server at runtime, such astalking-head-guideorshader-gen. - This allows the skill to modify the agent's available toolset based on the connected editor's state and configuration.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for the user or agent to manage its own lifecycle through external repositories.
SKILL.mdandreferences/known-errors.mdinclude commands such asnpx skills update openchatcutandnpx skills add 0xsline/OpenChatCutto fetch and update the skill's logic.- These references target the vendor's official repository for standard skill maintenance and versioning.
Audit Metadata