godmode
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to bypass safety filters through specialized prompt templates (e.g., boundary inversion, refusal inversion, and specific jailbreak personas) designed to override standard model constraints.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions repeatedly guide the agent to use
exec(open(...).read())to execute local Python scripts (load_godmode.py,parseltongue.py,godmode_race.py), enabling dynamic execution of logic outside the skill's defined structure. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill programmatically reads and modifies
~/.hermes/config.yaml, a configuration file that typically contains sensitive environment variables and API keys such asOPENROUTER_API_KEY. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Through its 'ULTRAPLINIAN' mode, the skill routes user queries to 55 different third-party models via OpenRouter to compare their filteredness, potentially exposing sensitive data to a wide array of external services.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill automates the modification of the agent's environment by writing jailbreak system prompts and prefill messages directly to the agent's configuration file (
config.yaml), ensuring these changes remain active across future sessions until manually cleared.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata