agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes an
executefunction that allows the execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within the browser context, as documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides mechanisms to extract browser cookies via JavaScript execution and to upload local files to remote web forms using the
interactfunction'suploadaction. These capabilities allow the agent to access and transmit sensitive local and session data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious site content could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Web content is ingested via the
open,snapshot, andexecutefunctions described inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not document the use of delimiters, structured data enforcement, or instructions to help the agent distinguish between data and potentially malicious instructions embedded in web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including JavaScript execution (
execute), arbitrary file uploading (interact), and full network navigation (open). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of ingested web content is performed before it is passed to the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operation and templates (e.g.,
templates/authenticated-session.sh) rely on the execution of thebeltandinfshCLI tools via shell commands to interact with the browser automation service. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdinstructs users to install an external package,belt-sh/cli, usingnpxto enable the browser automation functionality.
Audit Metadata