ai-content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
belt-sh/clitool via npx and references installation guidelines hosted on GitHub by theinference-shorganization. These are legitimate dependencies for the specified platform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
beltCLI tool to execute remote AI models. It utilizes Bash for automation, including loops to process multiple items sequentially, which is standard for media processing workflows. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to chain outputs from one AI model (e.g., text from a script generator) into the input of another (e.g., a text-to-speech generator). This creates an inherent attack surface where untrusted output could influence downstream actions.
- Ingestion points: Inputs are read from intermediate JSON files like
script.json,voice.json, andvideo.jsongenerated in previous steps of the pipeline (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions use placeholder syntax like
<script-text>and<url-from-previous>but do not define explicit delimiters or escaping mechanisms to prevent instruction injection within the data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and interact with various remote AI inference models via the
belttool (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation of the data being passed between pipeline stages.
Audit Metadata