ai-product-photography
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
beltCLI tool via Bash commands to execute AI image generation tasks. The access is restricted via theallowed-toolsfrontmatter toBash(belt *)which follows the principle of least privilege. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of the
belt-sh/clipackage vianpxand provides a link to an external installation guide on GitHub (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md). These resources are directly related to the vendor's own infrastructure for the service provided. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill template constructs shell commands by interpolating user-provided prompts into JSON strings for the CLI input. This creates a surface where malicious external data could attempt to influence the command execution.
- Ingestion points: Prompt content for product descriptions and variables like
PRODUCTin the batch generation example (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the provided Bash templates.
- Capability inventory: Execution of the
beltcommand via Bash subprocesses. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization logic is provided in the documentation, relying on the agent's default handling of string interpolation.
Audit Metadata