ai-voice-cloning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
beltCLI tool to execute various AI models for text-to-speech, voice cloning, and media merging. Access to this tool is explicitly defined in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs the user to install external dependencies using
npx skills add belt-sh/cliand references installation guides hosted on GitHub (raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/...). These resources are associated with the platform's standard ecosystem. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted text data from the user and passes it directly to remote inference APIs through the
beltCLI. - Ingestion points: User-supplied
promptandtextfields in the JSON payloads processed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are present in the provided examples to delimit user content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via the
belttool and potential file system writes using redirection (e.g.,> speaker1.json). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the text content before it is passed to the CLI.
Audit Metadata