building-inferencesh-apps
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation directs users to install necessary platform tools and prerequisites using piped shell commands from external sources.
- The platform CLI is installed using
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | shas noted in the mainSKILL.mdandreferences/cli.md. - Prerequisites for Python and Node.js development, including
uv,fnm, andnvm, are installed via similar piped execution methods from their respective official domains (astral.sh,vercel.app, andraw.githubusercontent.com). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The application boilerplates provided in the skill ingest untrusted user input, establishing an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
inference.pyandinference.jstemplates define apromptfield in the input schemas (AppInputandRunInput) to receive user text. - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use delimiters or boundary markers to isolate the user-provided prompt from the application instructions.
- Capability inventory: The templates include capabilities for network communication (using
httpxorOpenAIclients) and file system operations (using theFileclass), which could be leveraged if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic for the input prompt is included in the reference implementations.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata