content-repurposing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references installation instructions for the belt CLI hosted on GitHub at
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
beltCLI tool (authorized in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter) to perform various AI-driven tasks via theBashshell: - Authenticating with the inference service using
belt login. - Executing various remote applications for image generation (
falai/flux-dev-lora), text-to-speech (falai/dia-tts), video generation (google/veo-3-1-fast), and social media automation (x/post-create). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted user-provided data (e.g., blog posts, podcast transcripts) and interpolate it into templates for downstream AI tool calls.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted long-form content is ingested and processed in
SKILL.mdvia the 'Conversion Recipes' section. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the source content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bashto execute thebelttool, which has capabilities including media generation and social media posting. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define sanitization or escaping protocols for the content being repurposed before it is passed to the AI applications.
Audit Metadata