elevenlabs-dialogue
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external installation guide hosted on GitHub and prompts the installation of the
belt-sh/cliskill using thenpx skills addcommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
beltCLI tool to perform authentication (belt login) and run audio synthesis applications (belt app run) via the system shell. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User-supplied dialogue text is transmitted to the
inference.shservice to be processed into audio files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingest untrusted dialogue scripts which are then interpolated into shell command arguments, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
segmentsinput object inSKILL.mdwhich contains user-defined text and voice parameters. - Boundary markers: The input is encapsulated in a JSON structure, but the skill lacks explicit instructions for the AI to ignore or sanitize instructions embedded within the dialogue text segments.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
Bash(belt *)and the ability to write output to local files (e.g.,dialogue.json). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping mechanisms are defined for the user-provided text segments before they are passed to the CLI.
Audit Metadata