javascript-sdk
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation and reference files provide multiple implementation examples that use
eval(call.args.expression)to process tool calls. This pattern allows for arbitrary code execution if the agent is prompted to generate malicious mathematical expressions or logic snippets. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of
internalTools().codeExecution(true), which explicitly enables the AI agent to generate and execute code within its runtime environment. This is a high-privilege capability that should be used with caution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to add remote skills via
npx skills addfor tools likebelt-sh/cliand various platform-specific components (e.g.,@python-sdk,@infsh-cli). It also demonstrates fetching configuration and documentation from external URLs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SDK architecture presents a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through
agent.sendMessageand outputs from tools such asappToolorwebhookTool. - Boundary markers: The provided examples lack recommended delimiters or instructions to treat tool outputs as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The agents built with this SDK typically have access to command execution (
eval), runtime code generation, and network requests (webhookTool). - Sanitization: Although the
requireApproval()method is available for tools, several examples demonstrate direct execution of dynamic content without validation or human oversight.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata