seo-content-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external search services (Tavily and Exa), creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in search results could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested from
tavily/search-assistant,tavily/extract, andexa/searchand interpolated into the content brief generation process. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing these search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool to executebeltCLI commands, which could be abused if the agent is manipulated by injected data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization or filtering for the data retrieved from external search engines.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external tools and documentation hosted on the vendor's infrastructure.
- Evidence: Mentions installation of the
belt-sh/clipackage vianpxand references installation instructions located atraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute shell commands using the
beltCLI through theBashtool to perform keyword research and SERP analysis.
Audit Metadata