seo-content-brief

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external search services (Tavily and Exa), creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in search results could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested from tavily/search-assistant, tavily/extract, and exa/search and interpolated into the content brief generation process.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing these search results.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool to execute belt CLI commands, which could be abused if the agent is manipulated by injected data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization or filtering for the data retrieved from external search engines.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external tools and documentation hosted on the vendor's infrastructure.
  • Evidence: Mentions installation of the belt-sh/cli package via npx and references installation instructions located at raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute shell commands using the belt CLI through the Bash tool to perform keyword research and SERP analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 11:00 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — seo-content-brief