yolo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill automatically parses untrusted content from the Lovable web interface (chat logs, sidebar messages, and deployment logs) to trigger further automated actions.
- Ingestion points: Page content retrieved via
read_page,find, andjavascript_toolon thelovable.devdomain. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands in the data retrieved from the UI.
- Capability inventory: The skill can control the browser (
computertool), execute code (javascript_tool), and call external APIs via MCP (send_message). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of retrieved text is performed before it is used to determine the next step in the deployment flow.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to inspect the state of the git repository.
- Evidence:
references/detection-logic.mdandreferences/post-push-automation.mdusegit status,git log, andgit diffto identify changed files and commit hashes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automates the exposure of sensitive configuration metadata from a remote settings page.
- Evidence:
references/secrets-extraction.mddirects the agent to scrape the Lovable Cloud settings UI specifically to list the names of environment secrets likeSTRIPE_SECRET_KEYandOPENAI_API_KEY. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the agent with specific JavaScript code to be executed dynamically in the browser environment.
- Evidence:
references/automation-workflows.mdandreferences/secrets-extraction.mdcontain JavaScript snippets used withjavascript_toolto interact with the DOM and extract data.
Audit Metadata