youtube-thumbnail-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Remote Code Execution (CRITICAL): The skill instructs the user/agent to execute
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This pattern is highly dangerous as it bypasses package management safety and executes unverified remote code with shell privileges. The domaininference.shis not a trusted source. - External Downloads (HIGH): The skill references and installs external components using
npx skills add inference-sh/skills@.... These are untrusted dependencies that could contain malicious logic and are executed via Node.js. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill's metadata grants broad access to the Bash tool (
allowed-tools: Bash(infsh *)), which, when combined with the remote installation of theinfshCLI, creates a large attack surface for command injection. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill processes user intentions to generate image prompts without boundary markers or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Prompt templates within
SKILL.md(e.g., in the A/B testing and pattern sections). - Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: Execution of remote AI models via
Bash(infsh *). - Sanitization: No escaping or validation of user-provided content before interpolation into model prompts.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata