linear
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from a Linear workspace (such as issues, comments, and documentation) and use that data to perform further actions. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker with access to the Linear workspace could embed instructions in ticket descriptions or comments to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses tools like
list_issues,get_issue,search_documentation, andlist_commentsinSKILL.mdto read external data. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has write capabilities including
create_issue,update_issue,create_project, andcreate_commentinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is specified.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides the user or agent to fetch configuration and executable code from external sources to enable the Linear integration.
- Evidence: References to
https://mcp.linear.app/mcpandhttps://mcp.linear.app/sseinSKILL.mdfor MCP server configuration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include commands that modify the local environment and execute external packages.
- Evidence: Shell commands in
SKILL.mdsuch ascodex mcp add linear,codex mcp login linear, and the use ofnpx -y mcp-remoteto run a remote package.
Audit Metadata