skills/214140846/skills/linear/Gen Agent Trust Hub

linear

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from a Linear workspace (such as issues, comments, and documentation) and use that data to perform further actions. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker with access to the Linear workspace could embed instructions in ticket descriptions or comments to manipulate the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses tools like list_issues, get_issue, search_documentation, and list_comments in SKILL.md to read external data.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has write capabilities including create_issue, update_issue, create_project, and create_comment in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is specified.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides the user or agent to fetch configuration and executable code from external sources to enable the Linear integration.
  • Evidence: References to https://mcp.linear.app/mcp and https://mcp.linear.app/sse in SKILL.md for MCP server configuration.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include commands that modify the local environment and execute external packages.
  • Evidence: Shell commands in SKILL.md such as codex mcp add linear, codex mcp login linear, and the use of npx -y mcp-remote to run a remote package.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 09:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — linear