notion-meeting-intelligence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: the skill fetches and processes content from a user's Notion workspace using
notion-searchandnotion-fetchto generate meeting materials. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested documents contain adversarial instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior during document generation. - Ingestion points: data enters the agent context through
Notion:notion-searchandNotion:notion-fetchreferenced inSKILL.md(Workflow Step 1) and various example files. - Boundary markers: the instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks) or explicit warnings to ignore instructions within the fetched Notion content.
- Capability inventory: the agent has the ability to write back to the workspace via
Notion:notion-create-pagesandNotion:notion-update-page. - Sanitization: there is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation performed on the retrieved Notion content before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: the setup instructions in
SKILL.mddirect users to add an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server fromhttps://mcp.notion.com/mcp. This is an official domain belonging to Notion, a well-known service provider, and is used for legitimate configuration purposes.
Audit Metadata