21st-registry
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill primarily operates by executing the
21stCLI (@21st-dev/cli) to interact with the 21st.dev registry. This involves commands for publishing, editing, and deleting items, as well as managing team libraries and profile configurations. This is the intended functionality of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to read user-provided code files (e.g.,
.tsxcomponents,.cssthemes) to automatically detect names, slugs, and tags for publication. This ingestion of untrusted data from the filesystem into the agent's context constitutes a capability surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Local file paths for components, themes, and JSON profile data (
board.json). - Boundary markers: The prompt instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the ingested file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to read local files and execute shell commands via the
21stCLI. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the metadata auto-detection process.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: While the skill involves managing API keys for authentication, it explicitly includes a security rule instructing the agent to never publish files containing API keys or secrets. This proactive check reduces the risk of accidental data exposure.
Audit Metadata