21st-cli-use

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the 21st CLI and npx to search, retrieve, and install components.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the @21st-dev/cli tool from the npm registry and fetches component code, themes, and templates from the 21st.dev domain.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The 21st add command and the suggested npx shadcn alternative download and execute component installation scripts directly from remote URLs (e.g., https://21st.dev/r/<user>/<slug>). While these are vendor-owned resources, they involve executing remote content on the local system.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation identifies ~/.config/21st/auth.json as the file path where session tokens are stored. It also describes the format for API keys (21st_sk_…) and environment variables (TWENTYFIRST_TOKEN, API_KEY_21ST), which could be targeted by a malicious user for exfiltration.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to its capability to process untrusted data from an external catalog.
  • Ingestion points: External component code, CSS, and metadata are retrieved from the 21st.dev catalog through commands like 21st get and 21st search.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to isolate the downloaded code from the agent's control flow.
  • Capability inventory: The tool has the ability to write files to the filesystem (components/ui/) and trigger the installation of npm dependencies.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the remote content before it is integrated into the local project.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 11:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — 21st-cli-use