21st-cli-use
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
21stCLI andnpxto search, retrieve, and install components. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
@21st-dev/clitool from the npm registry and fetches component code, themes, and templates from the21st.devdomain. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
21st addcommand and the suggestednpx shadcnalternative download and execute component installation scripts directly from remote URLs (e.g.,https://21st.dev/r/<user>/<slug>). While these are vendor-owned resources, they involve executing remote content on the local system. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation identifies
~/.config/21st/auth.jsonas the file path where session tokens are stored. It also describes the format for API keys (21st_sk_…) and environment variables (TWENTYFIRST_TOKEN,API_KEY_21ST), which could be targeted by a malicious user for exfiltration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface due to its capability to process untrusted data from an external catalog.
- Ingestion points: External component code, CSS, and metadata are retrieved from the 21st.dev catalog through commands like
21st getand21st search. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to isolate the downloaded code from the agent's control flow.
- Capability inventory: The tool has the ability to write files to the filesystem (
components/ui/) and trigger the installation of npm dependencies. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the remote content before it is integrated into the local project.
Audit Metadata