competitor-teardown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external websites to perform market research, which exposes the agent to potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through
tavily/search-assistant,infsh/agent-browser, andtavily/extractwhich fetch content from arbitrary URLs provided during research. - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not specify using delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to isolate untrusted web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
beltCLI to execute search, browsing, Python code execution (infsh/python-executor), and image processing. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested external content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the system environment using the
beltCLI, invoking various application sub-commands via the Bash tool to perform automated research tasks. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a Python script template to be executed by the
infsh/python-executortool. This script dynamically generates a positioning map using thematplotliblibrary at runtime. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the user to install external software (
belt-sh/cli) and references installation guidelines hosted on a remote GitHub repository (github.com/inference-sh).
Audit Metadata