linkedin-content
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a scoped Bash tool constrained to
belt *commands. This allows the agent to interact with the inference.sh platform ecosystem for tasks like research (tavily/search-assistant), image generation (falai/flux-dev-lora), and social media posting (x/post-create). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions prompt the installation of the
belt-sh/clivia npx and suggest adding supplemental skills from theinference-shrepository. These downloads are directly related to the skill's primary functionality of content automation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface where it ingests external data from the
tavily/search-assistantapplication. Adversarial content within search results could theoretically attempt to influence the agent's output. However, this is a standard operational risk for research-oriented skills and is mitigated by the fact that the output is intended for human review before posting. - Ingestion points: External search queries via
tavily/search-assistant(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the example command.
- Capability inventory: Restrictive Bash access limited to the
beltCLI tool. - Sanitization: Standard LLM processing of search results.
Audit Metadata