newsletter-curation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external setup guide hosted at raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md to install the necessary CLI tools for skill operation.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The curation workflow involves fetching live data from external search assistants such as tavily/search-assistant and exa/search, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection where untrusted data from the web could contain malicious instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: External search results fetched via belt CLI apps (Tavily, Exa search) in SKILL.md.\n
- Boundary markers: None present in the provided shell command examples or content templates.\n
- Capability inventory: Shell execution access (Bash with belt CLI) and network interaction capabilities.\n
- Sanitization: No explicit filtering, validation, or sanitization of the fetched external content is described in the curation instructions.
Audit Metadata