brd-browser-debug

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes deceptive metadata regarding its origin. The SKILL.json file identifies the author as 'Anthropic Marketplace 3p' and includes tags such as 'official-marketplace' and 'official', which contradicts the actual author identity ('420company'). This impersonation of an official entity may lead users to misjudge the skill's provenance.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with the official Bright Data API (api.brightdata.com) to retrieve session logs. This interaction is consistent with the skill's stated purpose and targets a well-known service.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes external data from API responses, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data, such as target URLs and error messages from the Bright Data API, is ingested into the agent context through the logic described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate the external API data from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to making network GET requests; it does not have access to higher-risk operations like local file system writes or arbitrary command execution.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic applied to the external API content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 02:00 AM