brd-browser-debug
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes deceptive metadata regarding its origin. The
SKILL.jsonfile identifies the author as 'Anthropic Marketplace 3p' and includes tags such as 'official-marketplace' and 'official', which contradicts the actual author identity ('420company'). This impersonation of an official entity may lead users to misjudge the skill's provenance. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with the official Bright Data API (
api.brightdata.com) to retrieve session logs. This interaction is consistent with the skill's stated purpose and targets a well-known service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes external data from API responses, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data, such as target URLs and error messages from the Bright Data API, is ingested into the agent context through the logic described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate the external API data from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to making network GET requests; it does not have access to higher-risk operations like local file system writes or arbitrary command execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic applied to the external API content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata