xiaoqi-board
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches assets from external domains.
- It loads CSS from
https://fonts.googleapis.com(Google Fonts). - It fetches icons from a CDN at
https://cdn.thesvg.org/icons/{slug}.svg. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the
thesvgMCP (Model Context Protocol) toolset to perform icon searches and retrievals (search_icons,get_icon). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (oral thoughts, project outlines) to generate executable HTML files. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in project data.
- Ingestion points: User-provided chat text and logic outlines described in the '触发条件' (Trigger Conditions) section of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill implements a two-step process requiring user confirmation of a '看板蓝图' (Board Blueprint) before code generation, which serves as a human-in-the-loop validation step.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to call the
thesvgMCP and write files to the local00_专注区/directory. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or escape HTML entities from user-provided content before interpolation into the board template.
Audit Metadata