configure-clara-receptionist
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that involves reading business profile data and subsequently performing updates based on that data, which constitutes a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: Business profile and configuration data is retrieved from the Clara service via the
get_businesstool as specified inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or guardrails to treat the ingested external business data as untrusted content separate from the agent's instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent write access to business details, greetings, voice settings, and automated SMS templates through tools like
update_businessandupdate_receptionistinSKILL.md.\n - Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization mentioned; however, the skill mitigates the risk by instructing the agent to show the exact proposed change and obtain user confirmation immediately before every write operation.
Audit Metadata