coliseum-dispatch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads assignment data from an external file (
phase-2-assignments.md) and passes this content directly to subagents using theAgenttool. If these assignments contain malicious instructions, they could influence the behavior of the recipient agents. The skill provides a partial mitigation by instructing subagents to ignore conversation history and focus only on the provided prompt, but no technical sanitization or strict boundary delimiters are used. - Ingestion points: The skill reads
phase-2-assignments.md(via theReadtool) to facilitate both thepingpong-detectorcheck and the final dispatch. - Boundary markers: The instructions in Step 3 explicitly tell subagents to read only the provided prompt and avoid implicit conversation context, which acts as a logical instruction-based boundary but lacks technical enforcement.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
WriteandEditfor log management,Bashfor directory preparation (returns/), and theAgenttool to invoke subagents. - Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or filtering of the content from
phase-2-assignments.mdis performed before it is sent to theAgenttool.
Audit Metadata